Suspicious concept. Is the concept of 'intersubjective' necessary?
	This at first was written in Japanese in July 31, 2010. Noguti Hiromasa I got aware of some error about the translation. So, this was retranslated in October 3, 2011. The rinks from this page were changed in January 4, 2012.
	Since I now have abundant spare time because of some reasons, I often search the homepages of mine, using various keywords. And, sometimes it sees others' homepages it found there. Many of homepages like that are the explanation for new book. Anyhow, it is effective for spending time because it checks the title or other a little. About one month ago, I saw the words of 'intersubjectivity' by chance in the search like that. It feels that it once saw the similar words though it isn't clear where it saw that. Tentatively, I looked for into my bookshelf the book my memory shows. JJust then, I found one book it bought because of the title of 'intersubjectivity' about ten years ago. But I almost didn't read at that time because it lost interest in that at once. Because of that, I don't know what does 'intersubjectivity' mean, yet. So, I leafed through that book. And, it finds out the name of Husserl. That name has reminded me there is the book with the title of 'The idea of phenomenologic' by Husserl. However, I am not in the mood to read that. I looked the item of 'intersubjectve' up in one Japanese dictionary without taking 'The idea of phenomenologic'.
			According to that dictionary, the 'intersubjective' is the words Husserl advocated. And, it seems Husserl thought natural world and also cultural world are things common to many subjectum(cognition-subject), not to one subjectum(cognition-subject). Moreover, it seems Husserl named this situation as intersubjective phenomenon. Does the situation like that exist really? I got suspicious of his idea like that. However, it seems Husserl thought that a unified objective world forms because of the intersubjective phenomenon. That is the idea to be hard to understand. It feels the concept of intersubjective is dubious though it doesn't know why. 'It may be there is some error in the process of thinking. Isn't it possible to explain the world without the concept of intersubjective?'. That was my first impression. However, I can't accept this impression with confidence because I am not good at the philosophy of this kind. I started to think of this problem without clear course of thinking while feeling my strange irritation. However, I can't find out good answer easily. It probably was because I had been caught to the logic Husserl constructed. I started to inspect one's point of view.
	One day, I saw a fire in neighbourhood, and phoned up the fire station. But, the person receiving the telephone call is a fireman considerably suspicious by chance. He gave me various questions. 'Where are you? Did you see the burning fire really? Is there the evidence you saw the fire in neighbourhood?'. But, I can't understand his intention. I, while bewildered because of his strange questions, answered him only obediently. However, he says 'your answers aren't suitable for the proof', often pointing out the slight problems of my expression. By what on earth should I explain? At this moment, I am looking at the fire in front of eyes actually. I can insist with belief this fire in neighbourhood is fact. In spite of that, the fireman in question says 'you have to prove your utterance is right, with following my way of thinking'. What a troublesome man he is! In spite of this imminent situation, is the leisurely attitude like that okay? 'What do you mean? I said 'Fire occurred'. Come here at once! You will look at the fire sure!'. I insisted like that at once, while trembling because of anger.
	Needless to say, this is the made-up story. I dislike the philosophy which is constructed with enlarging the concepts cut into the pieces and with mixing those as if it makes a art with candies. It doesn't seem it is a good approach to truth. Rather it seems it makes a person's noticing truth hard. Anyhow, I almost can't understand the philosophy like that. By any chance, do I lack the ability to understand the philosophy? Or, is it because the way to translate into Japanese isn't proper ? Or else, is it because there are some errors into the philosophy like that? I don't know which is the cause. Anyway, the books on the philosophy like that aren't pleasant to read, and don't revitalize my intuition. As it thought before, it may be that I lack the ability to understand the philosophy like that. But, since I forgot the words of 'impudently' at considerably old times, it puts one's problems on a highest shelf, and is stating one's opinion now.
	I think the laws and concepts on natural science and on the other studies should be simple. And, it also guesses that the concepts hard to be understood with being parted into pieces, and the complicated structure constructed with the concepts like that are evidence that the process of the thinking for making the complicated structure like that includes some errors. This opinion probably is proper even if it is seen from the viewpoint of 'intersubjectivity'. It seems that as for the difficult concepts - in this case, it may be better to say that it is the wishful concepts - , it hasn't not only the objectivity but also the intersubjectivity. Even if it dares to suppose the situation the concept of 'intersubjective' fits, it seems this concept narrowly holds intersubjectivity only among a few believers in Husserl. However, would it be really the goal Husserl wanted? A person doing the thinking tends to often get drunk on one's idea or one's thinking. And, it is that the person like that, without noticing himself walking drunkenly and without noticing the actual aspect of the world, walks on the course different from the road he should go to. Now, it stops the extreme utterance here. Since it could finish inspecting my point of view at last, it has to go back to the main theme. Is really the concept of 'intersubjective' necessary to understand the world? It has to think this problem now. However, before it goes to that problem, it needs to explain one's world view or other. It is natural to do so because it is that it thinks, based on that world view. And, since the description about my world view and about the process of the thinking for that world view is in 'civilization and living body' and 'The origin of Japanese culture, read it please. However, since it seems the basic explanation is necessary for future argument, it states that, summarizing the process of thinking, in possible range. Caution: To tell the truth, I have not confidence so about my English. Since especially the writings introduced as references were written in old times, the expression may be unclear.
			First of all, the thing to say is that not until a cognition-subject recognizes the "objects for cognition", the world exists. If it says about it with an example, cognition-subject for me is myself. And, in this case, the "object for cognition" is all of phenomenons which include my thinking and body, and so on. Then, in this case, as for myself, because it exists as cognition-subject, it is only existence to not be the "object for cognition". Anyway, the objects for cognition like that are countless, are all of phenomenons including physical phenomenon, I insist. However, it is natural that this doesn't mean that cognition-subject necessarily can recognize all of phenomenons. The objects able to be recognized are decided by cognition-subject's ability of recognition. In that reason, it has to change the phrase saying that 'the "objects for cognition" are all of phenomenons to "the objects for cognition are the phenomenons able to be recognized", if it says strictly. However, it doesn't use the revised phrase like that after this because it is troublesome. In passing, to tell that truth, object for cognition isn't a phenomenon itself, if it is said strictly. However, for the moment, it adopts this expression here, to make understanding easy.
	Then, because of certain reason, it also is supposed that all to appear as phenomenon behave like cognition-subject. The reason why it can't assert that it is cognition-subject is that cognition-subject is nothing else but to be myself in this case. In other words, this is only mere analogical idea brought with comparing myself with the others' behaviors. And, it is certain this idea isn't based on clear evidence as well as the belief in one's memory though it can show a few supporting evidences for the moment. Reference: A civilization and ego., The complementary explanation about the ego. In spite of that, if it limits the 'object for cognition' to human being, no one would deny that all of the human being like that behave as cognition-subject. And, even if it asserts that all of human being are cognition-subject, it seems that the persons disagreeing with this opinion are a few. If so, it can say that the analogical idea in question has clear objectivity. Thereupon, it thought that it can apply this analogical idea to all phenomenons which include human being. An animal behaves as cognition-subject. A mineral also is so as well. And, the other various phenomenons also are so as well. It is because those phenomenons each can react to each other. And, those reactions occur, based on certain law though it is natural that the aspect of the reaction is different, corresponding to the circumstances and the 'object for reaction'. It is because those phenomenons each recognize the 'object for reaction', and do the logical calculation corresponding to the 'object for reaction'. In that meaning, it particularly can't find the difference between the human reactions and chemical reactions or other. All of reactions occur, based on the characteristic law corresponding to each. Now, in above explanation and the analogical idea, it showed that a human being, a phenomenon to be called as a substance, and the other phenomenons behave like cognition-subject. However, some persons may say 'I can't think a mere substance behaves as cognition-subject because a substance can understand nothing even if it assumes that a substance recognizes something for the reaction'. However, it doesn't seem that a substance can show same reaction under same conditions if a substance have not the ability of understanding. It should think that even the reaction between some substances is the evidence that the logical calculation about the relationship among those substances was done. And, the logical calculation is nothing else but to be a thinking.
	Our brain can do complex calculation. And, even one molecule of a small stone by sidewalk can do the calculation of the kind like that by simple way. So, it show certain reaction when it gets given certain stimulus. The cells composing our brain are exchanging information frequently in each other when we meet a problem. We call the situation like that as the thinking usually. It never be exaggeration even if it says the exchanging information is nothing else but to be a thinking. And, it can think a chemical reaction, and so on also to be a exchanging information as well as human thinking. In passing, it is natural that the reaction like that occur in the range of certain probability as well as human reaction. By the way, it is said at physics that substances, that is, neutrino and electron, and so on have both the nature of particle and the nature of undulation. However, my opinion is advancing than the usual opinion like that a little if my opinion is proper.
	As it stated at other statements of mine before, I think that the nature of particle is in the position different from the nature of undulation in physics. It was because nobody can see situation an electron is undulation though it is possible to see the situation an electron is a particle. Needless to say, if it observes the movement of particles, it is possible to confirm the nature of undulation. However, it isn't it directly saw situation an electron is undulation. If so, how should it understand the nature of undulation? I thought as follows about that. A particle is reality. However, the confirming the nature of undulation doesn't prove existence of undulation. In other words, it can't know whether undulation actually exists or not. So, I supposed the nature of undulation isn't in the real world, is a possibility to be as actual existence. The nature of undulation materializes as particle with getting cognition-subject's recognition in the range of certain probability to be based on certain possibility. That is the reason that the certain observer trying to see the situation an electron is particle can't know strictly where does an electron appear. In other words, it has to get satisfied with getting the conjecture in the range of certain probability. 'The true character of nature of undulation must be possibility'. I thought like that. By any chance, some persons may say that it doesn't seem that the above statement relates to the main theme. However, I don't think like that. Anyhow, it has to return the talk to the main theme. I stated before "object for cognition behaves as cognition-subject". If this opinion is proper, when the "object for cognition" behaves as cognition-subject, he recognizes me with observing my physique, looks, and material characteristic or other, that is, the phenomenons I give off. In other words, I am sending others the information like that. And, the work like that to send information is done also at my brain and body biochemically and as electric signal or other. In other words, it analogically can say the "objects for cognition" behaving as cognition-subject are in me as countless phenomenons. Needless to say, this viewpoint can be applied to the outside world of my body. In other words, it can say "object for cognition" behaving as cognition-subject are in the world as countless phenomenons. Then, the thing leads us to the analogical idea that the world behaves as one cognition-subject. But, it is natural that in the case that I am as first person, I am only one cognition-subject. And, it also is natural that all of the others are the "object for cognition". However, it is natural that at that time, I am also the "object for cognition" when I am as second person or third person.
			In passing, the concept of first person, the concept of second person, and the concept of third person express the relationship in between the persons. It never be the concept expressing the substance of certain person. Thereupon, it supposes here is one person called Yamada. And, it also supposes there I said 'You got fat lately a little'. In this case, Mr. Yamada was expressed with the concept of second person, that is, 'you'(Note 1). And, the 'he is fat' is the substance of him I expressed. In this case, even if it said the needless thing that "I will express you with the concept of second person now", it never be it said 'You are second person itself'. If it has said so in that meaning, it is mistake grammatically before arguing the logical relationship of the concepts concerned. Because he is Mr. Yamada, not second person. It is necessary to consider above things carefully if it tries to use those concepts. Needless to say, since everybody knows the thing, it may be not necessary to dare to say the thing like that. But, it seems that the error like that I pointed hides oneself into strangely difficult philosophy with a shrewd trick. By any chance, would it be my illusion?
	By the way, it can understand the above relationship between cognition-subject and the "object for cognition" with replacing cognition-subject and the "object for cognition" each with receiver of information and sender of information. And, there is the case the sender behaves as a receiver. Then, there also is the case the receiver behaves as a sender. In other words, they behave as a sender or as a receiver, corresponding to the situation. Reference: Information and cognition-subject.. Evolution, information, thinking. The physical world seen from the cognition-subject. Now, my world view has come to be almost clear with the above mentioned explanation. And, if it thinks about 'intersubjective' while considering my world view, it is hard to hold logical consistency between my world view and the concept of 'intersubjective'. If it tries to hold the consistency like that in force, it can't say it necessarily isn't possible. However, to do so only makes the talk hard, doesn't bring even a few benefits. Rather there is strong possibility it makes a misunderstanding or distortion increase, I think. "Therefore, the concept of 'intersubjective' is needless". I arrived at the conclusion like that. It states its reason as follows. TThe first cognition cognition-subject does is subjective originally, becomes most important and most valuable recognition at himself(note 2). At the space-time, at the mental circumstances, and at the other footing, and so on, I as cognition-subject is in the place different from the place the others are in. Therefore it is that it is natural that my point of view and recognition are different from the others' point of view and recognition. In other words, it is that it is impossible that I and others have my subjective world in common if it is said strictly. In that reason, we compare one's recognition with other's recognition. And, a person repeats the comparative work like that, to find out the consistency in between one's recognition and others' recognition. Objective recognition is created in the process like that. It seem there almost isn't the reason the concept of 'intersubjective' should be used at the process like that. At least I think the using the concept like that is meaningless. It seems the concept of 'intersubjective' was born of the misjudgement of who is cognition-subject having certain subjective recognition. For example, it supposes that one community as cognition-subject recognized one problem. In that aspect, the concept of 'intersubject' appears when the community's recognition is misjudged as the recognition the people of the community did. The concept of 'intersubject' is phantom. The intersubjective phenomenon doesn't exist. I thought like that. However, if it is possible to interpret and fix the concept of 'intersubjective' with my way of thinking, it is possible to use that concept. For example, it supposes strange phenomenon occurred in certain community. Needless to say, at that time, the people composing the community each recognized the phenomenon in question with each point of view. It is natural that their recognition each are different from each. Therefore, it can't decide how it should treat the phenomenon in question.
			Thereupon, the people start to create the objective recognition about the phenomenon in question, with comparing each recognition. And, the recognition constructed in the process like that becomes objective recognition the people have in common(note 3). Furthermore, that objective recognition creates the community's recognition. We have to notice that the community's recognition in that case is subjective recognition. I don't deny the concept of 'intersubjective' if it names the process like that as 'intersubjective phenomenon'. However, would the using the concept like that be necessary really? Note 1: In this case, I am expressed with first person, that is, the concept of 'me'. Note 2: Some persons may think that the expression saying that cognition-subject does the cognition is strange a little. It is because only cognition-subject can recognize the 'object for cognition'. However, if my conjecture that the 'object for cognition' behaves as cognition-subject is right, it is possible to express that the 'object for cognition' recognizes the 'object for cognition'. Therefore, the expressing that cognition-subject does cognition is proper. Note 3: In this case, it can't assert that all of people's subjective recognition necessarily change.
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