The true character of object for cognition Is the concept of intersubjective necessary? Part 2. August 26, 2010. Japanese Edition Noguti Hiromasa This was revised in October 1, 2011. It again added to this page the URL to link up, August 1, 2016.						The top page by English.
	At the "Is the concept of intersubjective necessary?", I stated that the process of thinking for establishing the concept of "intersubjective" includes some suspicious parts. However, it lacked some explanations. Thereupon, I decided to write "Part 2", in the title of "The true character of object for cognition". 1. About the motive of this consideration. It is natural that all thinking are based on the major-premise which is to be the base of each thinking. And if the major-premise like that is false, it also is natural that the conclusion from the thinking based on the major-premise like that is false unconditionally. In other words, the concept and world view at the thinking is very important in that meaning. Of course, it may not be necessary to say because this is simple truth. However, this truth often looks to be forgotten at complex thinking. So it dared to be stated. At the second Century, Ptolemaios who have been scholar active in Alexandria published Ptolemic system theory, saying Earth is center of universe. However today, most people know his theory was suspicious opinion. Probably it seems he needed to state the opinion like that in one's belief or benefit of something or because of certain circumstances. In other words, the major premise of his thinking the universe was already his geocentric system theory before the geocentric system theory is established. In that reason, he used the high-grade mathematical technique or other, trying to maybe hide the problems disadvantageous for one's geocentric theory. So in those days most people believed the terrible false conclusion is truth, because of mathematical technique of the purpose to pretend a strict method. Would it be exaggeration to say the Middle Ages got closed to the dark because of the social situation like that? Needless to say, the technologies of architecture, mathematics and so on cultivated at the ancient Greece and the Rome Empire had been inherited also at the Middle Ages though it may not be all. It supposes several parts of those technologies got more advanced at the Middle Ages. But it seems that the thinking and some technologies degenerated in the fields of philosophy, natural science and mathematics and so on. If it considers the situation like that, by any chance it may not be exaggeration to say various technologies to support the geocentric system theory brought the degeneration to philosophical thinking. Originally the footing of the technology of mathematics, architecture or other is the mind to try to find out the consistency on between various recognition. In that reason it can say the exact thinking about various phenomenons is very important. Furthermore, it is natural that the technologies like that are based on philosophical consideration and culture, the scientific knowledge. However, if the people start to forget the mental footing which found out the scientific knowledge, the technology like that starts to change one's state with obeying own logic, without considering the mental footing. And, the thing also applies to the political technique, the technique to think about concept. Needless to say, it can't assert that the thing necessarily brings the degeneration of the technology like that if it thinks only with the viewpoint of the progress in technology. It is because the situation that various technologies rapidly progress under the situation the mental footing was forgotten isn't so rare. However, there is the possibility that such a social situation brings the crisis of philosophical knowledge. In other words, there is the possibility that the above-mentioned technologies are used without philosophical consideration, to support certain bigoted belief or to give certain people the benefit. Whenever I view the recent social situation, I feel a fear that the philosophical degeneration like that might have started to occur. And, at that time, I always feel gloomy.
5: Lifework.			Actually certain people recently are using certain philosophical concept without deep consideration, to satisfy one's ambition or to get benefit of something. By any chance, if the concept like that hasn't the false part, it may be rare that such a use lacking consideration brings a harm. However, a using a concept which includes a false part, in easy mood is problem very much. It is because it is obvious the conclusion is false if the concept like that is used at the process of thinking. If such a social situation continues for long, it can't assert that the world doesn't go back to the dark Middle Ages. To tell the truth, I feel sorry for saying such a thing without so much knowledge. However, it can't assert that the false opinion like the geocentric system theory doesn't fill the world again. So I decided to state this problem. About ten years ago, the world started to show the intention to go back to Adam Smith. By any chance, this may be the sign that the anxious problem I feel occurs actually.
	Especially I feel an anger to the situation the concept of "intersubjective" is used easily. If it keeps using easily a concept hard to understand, the concept like that changes to a horrific demon as a time though it doesn't state the detailed explanation. For example it seems the risk like a witch-hunt is about to increase. And, the demon like that leads people to violent behavior in the situation the responsibility is unclear, as a time. By the way, it hears many of secret information adopted for a witch-hunt at the Middle Ages were an unfounded rumor. And today it seems the situation like that is about to get restored through a part of media, and so on. Probably it relates to the situation the people became excitable with the incident like a witch-hunt. So, the comment at the "Is the concept of 'intersubjective' necessary?", that is, "Part 1" came to be hard before I notice. 2. The complementary explanation of the part 1. The true character of object for cognition. Now here it tries the complementary explanation about why the concept of "intersubjective" includes a false part. In the "Is the concept of 'intersubjective' necessary?", I stated the thing like the meaning to be stated next. "It is natural that the cognition one cognition-subject does is different from the cognition the other cognition-subject does. It is because each cognition-subject exists with possessing his characteristic position, at the space-time, and at mental position or other. In other words, it is because each position to view the world is different from each because of above-mentioned difference of various meaning. Therefore, it is impossible that people share my subjective world if it sees strictly." However, in this case, certain counter-argument may be given against these comments. "Husserl isn't saying that someone's subjective world is shared by him and the others. His comment is that most cognition-subjects share natural world and cultural world. Therefore the saying that each cognition-subject can't share subjective world is irrelevant argument to "intersubject".". It seems the counter-argument in question is the contents like that probably. However, would the cultural world or natural world Husserl stated be objective world? Or would it be subjective world? Anyhow Husserl set the concept of natural world and cultural world as the fundamental elements for the explanation of "intersubjective". It means that Husserl already is recognizing those worlds. If not, it is because he can't set concept of those worlds for argument as a premise. And, it is certain first cognition is subjective originally. If so, those worlds Husserl stated to think about the relationship between "subjectivity" and "objectivity" and "intersubjectivity" are nothing else but to be Husserl's subjective world originally. In other words, the world Husserl thinks first in the process of thinking is the subjective world like that.
	It seems that Husserl himself also had recognized like that. A concept he first showed at the explanation of above-mentioned relationship was the "subjective". However, in this case, would Husserl have thought that the first cognition is subjective from the viewpoint of causation? Or, would it have been from the viewpoint of logical turn? At the moment, it can't judge exactly which viewpoint he had chosen. Anyhow it is certain he thought that cognition is subjective originally, even if it was from either viewpoint. If so, as it stated before, the two world Husserl first shows is nothing else but to be his characteristic subjective world. And if it assumes that the world Husserl stated is objective world, it is certain that each cognition-subject shares the world like that before it considers the concept of "intersubjective". (Subjective)cognition can't exist if cognition-subject doesn't exist. In other words, cognition-subject's existing is the major premise of cognition's existing. And, it can think that cognition-subject, while doing (subjective)cognition, shares, for the moment, objective recognition supposed to be for all cognition-subject. If it considers the conditions like that, it feels suspicious that Husserl didn't state whether the two worlds he stated are objective world or are subjective world. By any chance, wouldn't he have come to realize the problem like that? Or else, would he have realized the logical contradiction I found out in the process of above thinking? If so, he must have tried to hide this logical contradiction in the purpose to justify one's idea though it doesn't know whether it was conscious intention or not. Thereupon, it thinks about the logical contradiction like that on Husserl's opinion moreover. Husserl's explanation about the relationship of most subjectums(cognition-subjects) and two worlds(natural world and cultural world) is right probably if it is seen from the viewpoint of symbolic logic. However, it seems that it is hard to find exact meaning from that explanation. If he intended to state that explanation exactly, he should have stated "Most subjectums(cognition-subject) share natural world and cultural world which are as subjective(or objective) worlds.". It seems the expression like that is most right because it is that the cognition-subject does the recognition like that whether its recognition is subjective or objective.								6: The wavering soul.
	If it tries to find out truth, it should use at the process of thinking, a exact expression, not a expression hard to understand. If not, it is led to a false conclusion. In other words, in most cases, it only is caught to the feeling it solved the problem before reaching a deep understanding with using the concept hard to understand or also expression hard to understand. It can't think that the thinking under the situation like that reaches truth. Now, it can assert that a (subjective)cognition to be in common to each cognition-subject doesn't exist. Even if certain people dare to insist the cognition like that is in common to each cognition-subject, it is certain that as a matter of fact, the cognition like that is objective recognition anymore. In other words, it think it should say "similar (subjective)cognition be" if it dares to say. And, it is meaningless to state more than it on (subjective)cognition. It is certain that the object for cognition appears as phenomenon. In other words, we only can recognize the phenomenon. And, the aspect of phenomenon like that already is different, corresponding to each cognition-subject. In other words, object is shown in phenomenon different a little for each cognition-subject. Therefore for the moment, it is that no one can state more than saying "similar (subjective)cognition be". In spite of that, it seems that certain people try to justify the concept of "intersubjective", using the concept hard to understand or other, insist that most people share above-mentioned two worlds. However, the conclusion that similar (subjective)cognition be is the terminal station of this argument. There aren't rails ahead of this conclusion anymore. In spite of that, the doing the argument in question is nothing else but to be accumulation of mere strained interpretation anymore. This looks to be same as the episode that Ptolemaios tried to make sound plausible, using mathematical technique. However, this kind of thinking shows very logically consistent aspect partly, leaving the major-premise. But when it comes near the core of problem, it brings the falsehood difficult to find out into the process of thinking, using the words of "roughly" or "though not all". This is very similar to the episode saying that Ptolemaios said "a few difference between the result in observation and the mathematical result is God's work"about his geocentric system theory. Probably it seems it feels this kind of philosophy is hard to understand because of the circumstances like that. So, I don't know right philosophy yet.
Schringer's cat and the computer to decide our future.			I think that cognition is established by the characteristic interrelationship between a soul(cognition-subject) and a "object for cognition". In other words, it is impossible that not only (subjective)cognition but also objective recognition both be, if it is independent of this interrelationship. Anyhow, in the reason like that, it can't accept Husserl's words like that most subjectums(cognition-subjects) share natural world and cultural world. In spite of that, if it dares to try to say that, as it thought before, it has to say "Most subjectums(cognition-subject) share natural world and cultural world which are as subjective(or objective) worlds". However, that utterance, for the moment, is right only in the meaning of the "it shares objective world". Therefore, the space the concept of "intersubjective" goes into exists nowhere at this process of thinking. Husserl's intention gets broken here. The Intersubjective phenomenon doesn't exist. Not until each (subjective)cognition is compared, and recognized about the common points, objective recognition is established. In other words, if the works like that aren't done, no one can know whether there are common points, or not. And, it can't say (subjective)cognition has common points to other subjective cognition, without the works like that. It is that there isn't the method of objectify of (subjective)cognition, except the works like that. Therefore my opinion on the relationship of cognition-subject and two worlds in question Husserl stated relates to future consideration deeply. It never be about the problem of mere expression. A concept is born of the process of constructing objective recognition which it stated before. In other words, the things we can share are only objective recognition and concept born of the process like that if it dares to say. However if it is said strictly, no one can assert that people share the objective recognition and concept completely. Therefore it is natural much more that it can't share subjective world. But by any chance, there may be a person saying "but there may be subjective concept" somewhere. Probably in this case, it isn't that he is saying that the meaning or contents is subjective. It seems it means that the concept itself is subjective.
	However it can't imagine the concept like that. And it doesn't seem there is the concept like that. But if there is the concept like that, or if it really is a concept, by any chance, it may be possible to share the concept like that. And if so, the concept like that may be the base of the concept of "intersubjective". However, his comment is meaningless, as it thought before. If someone tries to explain something whether it is (subjective)cognition or objective recognition, he has to conceptualize his recognition. And, he has to think about various problems to conceptualize his recognition. Needless to say, it is nothing else but to be the process of the objectify of (subjective)cognition. And, it needs others for conceptualization even if it is the supposed others. There can't be a conceptualization without others to be given the explanation . In this case, one's self also is one of others to be given explanation. In other words, conceptualization is nothing else but to be the objectify of something to explain to others like that. Therefore a situation that a concept itself is subjective is impossible. And, it shouldn't forget that thinking is one kind of a exchanging information. Whether some falsehood is included to one concept, if many people can't accept the similar meaning and contents from the concept in question, as a matter of fact, the concept in question doesn't function as concept. And it is natural that the thing is applied also to the concept having the subjective meaning and contents, for example "feeling sad","feeling fun" and so on. However, it can assume next counterargument. "You said before that a phenomenon appears as the different aspect, corresponding to each cognition-subject. But, as for object itself, it is in common to each cognition-subject, isn't it?". However, my opinion about this problem would be stated a little later because of the convenience of the composition. By the way, Husserl used the concepts of "natural world and cultural world" at the process of his thinking, as it stated before. At least from that point of time, the base of thinking about those worlds was his subjective worldview. Moreover, the subjective worldviews aren't in common to everybody. Therefore, the concept of "intersubjective" is meaningless. And, no one need to create the concept like that in force. This problem is solved at once if someone says "we are establishing objective recognition with exchanging information about each (subjective)cognition, then with conceptualizing and comparing each subjective cognition and finding out the common point from those.". But, if it names above-mentioned process "intersubjective phenomenon", it would be ok for the moment. As for the thing, it was already stated in "Is the concept of "intersubjective" necessary?". However, Husserl wouldn't get satisfied with this conclusion probably. Probably it seems he have asked something to depend on across the terminal station of thinking. And, probably he wasn't aware of the difference of cognition a individual does and cognition a group does. I think that the objective recognition between the individuals belonging to one group establishes the (subjective)cognition that group does. However, it must be that Husserl, not being aware of the thing, mixed up cognition a individual does with cognition a group does. However, by any chance he also may have been aware of the thing. So, it may be that he mixed the falsehood hard to find to one's opinion, trying to escape out of the logical problems he invited in. And, wouldn't it be that he tried to reach something to depend on he believes to be across the terminal station of thinking? However, there is the wall of truth which nothing can pass through, on the terminal station of thinking. Once someone believed it passed through that wall, it is that his thinking roams around the labyrinth called falsehood. In passing, it assumes there is one dog in front of my eyes. Thereupon I thinks what kind of dog he is. In this case, I would compare that dog to the various concepts accumulated into my brain, while observing that dog. So, I can know he is a poodle. In this case, it can say this is the terminal station of thinking. In other words, this thinking can't advance forward than this. But would this have been the needless explanation?
	Note: There is the description about ameba in the"5, Powers and evolution" or other on my idea that the objective recognition between the individuals belonging to one group establishes the (subjective)cognition that group does. That is the base of this idea. But since those were written at considerably old times, the edition in English may need to be rewritten. By the way, as I stated before, I understand the world with the relationship in between a soul(cognition-subject) and a "object for cognition". And, if it thinks according to this understanding, it is natural that the world to first be recognized is subjective world. On the other hand, the objective world I recognize is established as the result that the information exchanged by me and others brings the common points of recognition to me and others. In this case, I am cognition-subject. And also others appearing as phenomenon who originally are the "object for cognition" for me behave as cognition-subject. Needless to say, there is possibility that such others actually are cognition-subject. However no one has the method to know the thing. It only can get the assumption like that with analogy. But, I think this analogy is proper to find out a truth in this case. Anyhow, I, to recognize objective world, needs one's self and others recognizing object. Therefore, objective world is only secondary world for me who is cognition-subject in this case. Not until subjective world exists, objective world can exist for me. In other words, subjective world is the major-premise of my recognizing objective world. Therefore, it is difficult that a cultural world is objectified because people's recognition about world is easily influenced by interests of people. And it is relatively easy that a natural world is objectified. For example, it is difficult that the opposing communities share same viewpoint about history to the opponents. On the other hand, the results of natural science, and so on are accepted relatively easily. Anyhow it can think that countless cognition-subjects not being me exist though it is by the above-mentioned analogy. In that reason, it can think that (subjective)cognition about one object also be countless. But it doesn't deny that similar (subjective)cognition be.								The vector of the change of a living vody.
	However, certain people may say that each (subjective)cognition shares its several parts. And if this opinion is right, the common points like that can be a base of the concept of "intersubjective". However, I deny there are the common points like that. Needless to say, it doesn't deny most dogs have the same sense for cognition in common. And it also doesn't deny dogs each do similar cognition in the similar situation. But, even if several persons said my cap is red, it can't assert they recognized same red. It is that they said "it is red" about certain situation of color with having learned the concept of red from their society. No one can recognize the red color other person saw. Then, since the red expressed by them was already conceptualized when they said "that cap is red", it can say that this red color is objective red, not subjective red. As it stated before, each cognition-subject exists with possessing his characteristic position, at the space-time, and at mental position or other. In other words, each position to view the world is different from each because of difference like that. Therefore, it is that it is natural that each cognition about one object is different from other's cognition though there is possibility one cognition is similar to other's cognition. It, to remake the cognition to the recognition which should be in common to people, needs the work of conceptualization, that is, the work of the objectify. The thing was stated also a little before. The world can exist because of the interrelationship in between a soul(cognition-subject) and a "object for cognition", as it was stated at "Part1". In this statement, a "object for cognition" roughly is same as "phenomenon". However, if it is said strictly, a "object for cognition" is the concept different from "phenomenon". It can think that an object appears as a phenomenon for one cognition-subject if he catches as information the stimulus the object emits. For example, even if others had recognized that phenomenon, that phenomenon isn't the phenomenon for me still until I recognize that phenomenon. That is the phenomenon to others insistently. In other words, even if one stimulus the object emits is caught to me and you at same time, I accept an information different a little from an information you accept, from that stimulus. In that reason, an object shows a slightly different phenomenon, corresponding to me or you. It seems that the understanding like that is proper. Therefore, the cultural world and natural world for a cognition-subject is only the whole of the phenomenons like that. For example, the phenomenon called aurora also shows the slight or very different aspects, corresponding to the ability of recognition each individual has. Please consider difference of the aurora an insect and a person see! Anyhow, if it think that the natural world and cultural world Husserl stated is the whole of the phenomenons, Husserl's opinion is broken also here, as it thought. However, certain person may bring up one counterargument. "But, the object to be the origin of the phenomenon is in common to all cognition-subject, isn't it?". It probably is the counterargument like that. And, also it is possible to say "the natural world and cultural world Husserl stated means the whole of the objects like that". However, would what be the true character of the "object for cognition"? The following is my opinion on the thing.
Three dimension universe with characteristic time.			But, there is the problem which should be solved before I state my opinion. Would what be thing completely to be in common to all cognition-subject? The answer is that it recognizes something. And, it can't find out the answer except that. In other words, all existence to do cognition share the situation that they distinguish one's self and the other. In this case, it is natural that one's self is cognition-subject. And, it also is natural that others are all object including one's thinking and also body. Cognition is born by a phenomenon spreaded in front of eyes at the one dot called present which is on time axis. On the other hand, it also is natural that the phenomenon like that appears whenever the stimulus as information is recognized by cognition-subject. In other words, it is this relationship is logical relationship, not causation. And it is impossible the information like that means completely same things for each cognition-subject, in the reason stated before. Even if the stimulus like that is judged to be in common to people by the physics, the meaning of information the stimulus emits is different, corresponding to each cognition-subject. Thereupon, one problem appears. It is that we have to think about what is the true character of the "object for cognition".
	However, does the object for cognition have the true character really? "By any chance, there may not be the method to examine such a thing". It thought so, caught to the impression like a intuition a moment. It is that at that time, it thought the object for cognition may be across terminal station of thinking. Object for cognition always be in past for us. We only can confirm the existence of the "object for cognition" through the phenomenon appearing now. And, the confirmed aspects each are different, corresponding to each cognition-subject though there may be the similar. If so, isn't it that we can't know even of whether the object like that can be in common to us, to say nothing of the true character of object like that? In other words, isn't it that it can't deny not only the possibility that the object like that is in common to us, but also the possibility that the object like that isn't in common to us? If so, it seems that right answer is that no one can state the confirmatory answer about the two possibility in principle. And, it seems this is the terminal station of thinking. If so, even if certain people choose either possibility in force and make the thinking advance, it is plain that its conclusion is false. In other words, even if it insists that the "object for cognition" is in common to us and puts it on the major-premise of the argument, its conclusion can't hold the consistency with the facts. Therefore, the concept of "intersubjective" also can't hold the consistency with the facts.
The physical world the cognition-subject sees.				However, can't it know the true character of object in question really? I changed the thinking to "it can't say the true character is unclear completely" here. It is that my opinion about undulation at physics I stated before led me to rethink like that. I think that undulation as actual existence(not reality) appears as reality, in the extent of certain probability. In other words, that is the physical phenomenon to be as reality. It seems that object in question hasn't a fixed true character if it considers the certain probability in question. In other words, it seems that object in question is only certain possibility before it appears as reality, that is, phenomenon. (In passing, this turn is as the logical turn, not causation, because we can't recognize object itself.). And, it is natural that the possibility like that, to appear as reality, needs the existence of cognition-subject. The aspect of phenomenon is different, corresponding to the cognition-subject to recognize, as it was stated before. And, the object for cognition appears as the phenomenon with selecting certain state from in the extent of certain probability certain possibility. In other words, it can say that the relationship between the cognition-subject and possibility like that is relationship characteristic at him. If so, the concept of "intersubjective" is meaningless. It can't call the meaningless concept the concept. Therefore, it can't use the concept like that. It brings nothing else but to lead a person to the feeling that it knows something. Even if it thinks that the concept like that is possible to use, it perhaps is in the religious field, I believe firmly, now.
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